SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Ranjan, Ram; Lubowski, Ruben N..

We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers' perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies.

A Principal-Agent Model for Investigating Traceability Systems Incentives on Food Safety

Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Asymmetric information; Reporting; Indemnities; Risk management; Livestock Production/Industries; C61; D82; Q12; Q18; Q28.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15653

Resende Filho, Moises de Andrade.

This article investigates the effects of contingent payments and a traceability system's expected traceback rate of success on the food safety effort exerted by raw material suppliers. This sheds light on when contingent payments and the reliability of a traceability system are substitutes and complements to each other in terms of inducing raw material suppliers to exert higher food safety effort. In addition, the effect of higher penalties and costs of food safety crisis on the effort to be induced by buyers (principal) on suppliers (agents) is investigated under a symmetric information setting. Finally, the asymmetric information setting is formalized as a principal-agent model and left to be explored in a future work. Some numerical exercises are...

Palavras-chave: Information Asymmetry; Identity Preservation; Food Traceability; Supply Chain Management.; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; D82; D86; C61.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7897

A Theory of Firm Decline

Gian Luca, Clementi; Cooley, Thomas; Di Giannatale, Sonia.

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside...

Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Entry Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection?

Palavras-chave: Principal Agent; Moral Hazard; Hidden Action; Incentives; Survival; Firm Dynamics; Financial Economics; D82; D86; D92; G32.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92788

Quillerou, Emmanuelle; Fraser, Rob W..

The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on agricultural foregone income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on farm land heterogeneity, could lead to adverse selection of farmers into the scheme. However, the Higher Level Scheme (HLS) design includes some features that potentially reduce adverse selection. This paper studies the adverse selection problem of the HLS using a principal agent framework at the regional level. It is found that, at the regional level, the enrolment of more land from lower payment regions for a given budget constraint has led to a greater overall contracted area (and thus potential...

Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Evidence in the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme?

Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; Agri-environment; Environmental Stewardship; Principal-agent; Contract; Environmental Economics and Policy; D78; D82; H44; Q18; Q58.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51068

Quillerou, Emmanuelle; Fraser, Rob W.; Fraser, Iain.

The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on foregone agricultural income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on farm land heterogeneity, could lead to adverse selection of farmers into the Scheme and therefore reduced cost-effectiveness of the Scheme. This reduced cost-effectiveness would be represented by a systematic overpayment of farmers for the land enrolled into the Scheme, compared to the opportunity cost of production. This paper examines the potential adverse selection problem affecting the higher tier of the Environmental Stewardship, the Higher Level Stewardship, using a principal agent framework combined...

AN AGENDA FOR THE DESIGN AND STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; Agri-environment; Environmental Stewardship; Principal-agent; Contract; Environmental Economics and Policy; D78; D82; H44; Q18; Q58.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91676

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A..

The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earths fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies...

Analysis of the Constraints to the Development of a Domestic Improved Seed Potato Industry in Mali

Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353

ASSET STORABILITY AND HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS IN COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS

Diallo, Marthe.

This paper outlines proposed research, using concepts of New Institutional Economics, to identify the factors constraining the emergence of a market for domestically produced improved seed potatoes in Mali. It uses the Principal –Agent model to outline how to investigate the feasibility of developing a domestic seed potato industry in Mali by applying the concepts of efficient contract designs and other institutional arrangements. This research will contribute to the literature on: (a) contract and institutional design in the context of asymmetric information and uncertainty typical of agricultural markets in low-income countries and (b) design of improved seed production systems, particularly for clonal crops, in developing countries. The Malian potato...

Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation

Palavras-chave: Principal-agent model; Seed systems; Mali; Agricultural technology development; Input markets; Contracting; Potatoes; Food Security and Poverty; International Development; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; D82; L14; Q13; Q16.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50351

Yang, Jian; Awokuse, Titus O..

This paper examines risk minimization hedging effectiveness for major storable and nonstorable agricultural commodity futures markets. Based on the error correction model bivariate GARCH frameworks, some evidence is found that the hedging effectiveness is stronger for storable commodities than nonstorable commodities under consideration. The finding illustrates an important difference between storable and nonstorable commodities with regard to their hedging function.

ASYMMETRY IN RAW MILK SAFETY PERCEPTIONS AND INFORMATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK IN FRESH PRODUCE MARKETING AND POLICY

Palavras-chave: Commodity futures; Asset storability; Hedging effectiveness; Multivariate GARCH; Marketing; D82; G19.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15826

Knutson, Ronald D.; Currier, Russell W.; Ribera, Luis A.; Goeringer, L. Paul.

Scientific evidence clearly indicates that consumption of raw milk carries substantial disease-inducing health risks. While federal U.S. policy mandates that milk moving in interstate commerce be pasteurized; within 41 of 50 states, raw milk can be obtained for consumption. Warning labels notwithstanding, a segment of U.S. consumers pays higher prices for higher-risk raw milk than for either organic or conventional milk. The behavioral factors leading to raw milk consumption are explored. The paternalistic regulatory options for reducing the risk associated with drinking raw milk are identified. Implications for fresh produce sold directly from farms to consumers or through farmers markets are drawn.

Consequences of Firms' Relational Financing in the Aftermath of the 1995 Mexican Banking Crisis

Palavras-chave: Raw milk; Pasteurization; Health risks; Behavioral economics; Bounded rationality; Paternalistic regulations; Public health; HACCP; GLOBALG.A.P.; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; A12; A13; A14; D11; D18; D46; D71; D78; D82; I18; K23; K32; Q11; Q18.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116440

Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for New Genetically Modified Food Products: Evidence from Experimental Auctions of Intragenic and Transgenic Foods

Castañeda, Gonzalo.

This paper shows that, in the aftermath of the 1995 banking crisis, relational financing was a two-edged sword for firms listed on the Mexican Securities Market. On the negative side, only bank-linked firms observed on average a dependence on cash stock to finance their investment projects. On the positive side, the banking connection was important to boost their profit rates during the 1997-2000 period, at least for financially healthy firms. These econometric results are derived from dynamic panel data models of investment and profit rates, which are estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments, where level and difference equations are combined into a system.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Relational financing; Banking crisis; Internal capital markets; L25; D82; N26.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37460

Colson, Gregory; Huffman, Wallace E..

Early GM traits were obtained by transferring genes across species, largely from soil bacteria. Part of the consumer resistance to them has been their transgenic nature. Recently, breakthroughs have occurred using intragenic bioengineering where genes are moved long distances within a specie, for example in potato, and without antibiotic markers. The objective of this research is to assess consumers’ acceptance and willingness to pay (WTP) for new intragenic fresh potato, tomato, and broccoli with higher levels of antioxidants and vitamin C, which are consumer traits. To elicit consumer valuations, a new series of experimental auctions were conducted in 2007 that built upon methodology developed in our earlier research. WTP was assessed in a multi-round...

Contracting with Smallholders under Joint Liability

Palavras-chave: GM foods; Consumer attributes; Willingness to pay; Economics experiments; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q10; D11; D82; D44.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49986

Kaminski, Jonathan.

Replaced with revised version of paper Jan. 11, 2012

Corporate and Consumer Social Responsibilities: Label Regulations in the Lab

Palavras-chave: Contract farming; Moral hazard; Joint liability; Peer monitoring; Agricultural Finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D82; L14; 013; Q13.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93128

Etile, Fabrice; Teyssier, Sabrina.

Although consumer attitudes toward corporate social responsibility are positive, socially responsible (SR) products are far from gaining significant market shares. Information asymmetries have been identified as one of the factor contributing to this attitude-behaviour gap, because social responsibility is a credence attribute. Signalling may remedy this market failure. We use an experimental posted offer market to investigate the impact of various regulatory requirements for labels on sellers’ choice to supply SR products and to signal it, and on buyers’ choice of ethical quality. Three treatments are tested: label certification by a third-party, “cheap-talk signalling” with random monitoring and with or without reputations. Individual social preferences...

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Labels; Social responsibility; Social preferences; Separating equilibrium; Market game; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Marketing; C92; D82; L15; M14.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120399

Creating Incentives for Micro-Credit Agents to Lend to the Poor

Aubert, Cecile; de Janvry, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth.

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have introduced incentive pay schemes for their credit agents to induce information acquisition on borrowers. Bonuses linked to repayment are efficient for profit-oriented MFIs but insufficient for nonprofit MFIs trying to reach very poor borrowers, when repayment and wealth are positively correlated. We show that no incentive scheme is consistent with this (non-verifiable) objective: Random audits on the share of very poor borrowers selected by the agent become necessary. Under the optimal contract, non-profit MFIs generally maximize the number of poor borrowers it services by crosssubsidization between very poor and less poor borrowers.

Crime and Education in a Model of Information Transmission

Palavras-chave: Micro-credit; Pro-poor; Objectives; Incentives; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; O16; D82; L31..

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25024

Cortes, Darwin; Friebel, Guido; Maldonado, Dario.

We model the decisions of young individuals to stay in school or drop-out and engage in criminal activities. We build on the literature on human capital and crime engagement and use the framework of Banerjee (1993) that assumes that the information needed to engage in crime arrives in the form of a rumor and that individuals update their beliefs about the profitability of crime relative to education. These assumptions allow us to study the effect of social interactions on crime. We first show that a society with fully rational students is less vulnerable to crime than an otherwise identical society with boundedly rational students. We also investigate the spillovers from the actions of talented students to less talented students and show that policies that...

Crop insurance market development in a transition economy: The case of Kazakhstan

Palavras-chave: Human Capital; The Economics of Rumors; Social Interactions; Urban Economics; Labor and Human Capital; D82; D83; I28.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96845

Heidelbach, Olaf; Bokusheva, Raushan.

We analyze the current state and future requirements of an agricultural income stabilization mechanism in a transition country – namely, the crop insurance system in Kazakhstan. Three objectives will be pursued: First, factors influencing the development of the crop insurance market will be identified. Second, insurance’s capabilities to efficiently stabilize income under transition circumstances will be evaluated. Finally, recommendations for developing crop insurance as an effective income stabilization tool will be provided. Results indicate that the prevailing institutional framework for establishing a sustainable crop insurance system is rather weak, and available insurance products are not preventing the problem of asymmetric information to a...

Cross Compliance: what about compliance?

Palavras-chave: Risk-management; Crop insurance; Institutions; Mathematical programming; Kazakhstan; Agricultural Finance; Risk and Uncertainty; D81; D82; G22; Q14.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51614

Stefani, Gianluca; Giudicissi, Eufrasia.

We reviewed some moral hazard (MH) models applied to agri-environmental policies and identified the main methodological aspects of the literature on this topics. Imperfect vs incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model. Most papers point out the role of farmers' risk aversion in mitigating MH. Others highlight that the observed high rate of compliance is still somewhat paradoxical given current enforcement strategies with low fines and monitoring levels. Cross compliance confirm these findings and urges further studies on dynamic models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour.

Current factors of insurance in agriculture

Palavras-chave: Cross-compliance; Moral Hazard; Enforcement; Agri-environmental schemes; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q15; Q58; D82.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99597

Bokusheva, Raushan; Heidelbach, Olaf.

This discussion paper is our response to numerous questions and the desire of our counterparts from the CIS countries to receive more up-to-date information about insurance in agriculture. Accordingly, we have tried to shed light on the main aspects of insurance as one tool of risk management in agriculture. Thus, our purpose is to give the reader information on principles and potential of insurance, its main problems and possible solutions. Additionally, this paper provides a comparative overview of the presently most widespread insurance schemes.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE EFFECT OF BUDGET BALANCE AND POLLUTION CEILING CONSTRAINTS

Palavras-chave: Risiko; Versicherung; Versicherungsprodukte; Landwirtschaft; Risk; Insurance; Insurance schemes; Agriculture; Слова: риск; Страхование; Страховые схемы; Сельское хозяйство.; Agribusiness; Farm Management; Industrial Organization; International Development; Risk and Uncertainty; G22; Q14; D82.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92167

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A..

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal with such firms through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex post contracts (IEAs), which can be implemented by the SNGA, in turn, in the case where governments and firms in each nation do not collude and then in the case where governments and firms do collude. I find that the monetary transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are not very sensitive to the...

Do Farmers Value The Environment? Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program Auctions

Palavras-chave: Environmental; Agreement; LDCs; Budget; Ceiling; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Development; D62; D82; Q25.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28347

Vukina, Tomislav; Levy, Armando; Marra, Michele C..

The paper uses data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of these auctions is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. The results indicate that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they consistently value those environmental improvements which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less emphasis on those benefits which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife habitat.